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Abstract
Background: An epidemic of a Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) caused by a new
coronavirus has spread from the Guangdong province to the rest of China and to the world, with
a puzzling contagion behavior. It is important both for predicting the future of the present outbreak
and for implementing effective prophylactic measures, to identify the causes of this behavior.
Results: In this report, we show first that the standard Susceptible-Infected-Removed (SIR) model
cannot account for the patterns observed in various regions where the disease spread. We develop
a model involving two superimposed epidemics to study the recent spread of the SARS in Hong
Kong and in the region. We explore the situation where these epidemics may be caused either by
a virus and one or several mutants that changed its tropism, or by two unrelated viruses. This has
important consequences for the future: the innocuous epidemic might still be there and generate,
from time to time, variants that would have properties similar to those of SARS.
Conclusion: We find that, in order to reconcile the existing data and the spread of the disease, it
is convenient to suggest that a first milder outbreak protected against the SARS. Regions that had
not seen the first epidemic, or that were affected simultaneously with the SARS suffered much
more, with a very high percentage of persons affected. We also find regions where the data appear
to be inconsistent, suggesting that they are incomplete or do not reflect an appropriate
identification of SARS patients. Finally, we could, within the framework of the model, fix limits to
the future development of the epidemic, allowing us to identify landmarks that may be useful to set
up a monitoring system to follow the evolution of the epidemic. The model also suggests that there
might exist a SARS precursor in a large reservoir, prompting for implementation of precautionary
measures when the weather cools down.
Background
Since November 2002 (and perhaps earlier) an outbreak
of a very contagious atypical pneumonia (now named
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) initiated in the
Guangdong Province of China. This outbreak started a
world-wide epidemic after a medical doctor from
Guangzhou infected several persons at an hotel in Kow-
loon around February 21st, 2003 (SAR Hong Kong,
China). Although apparently classical in its onset, the pat-
tern of the outbreak became puzzling after an estate in
Hong Kong was affected, with a huge number of patients
infected by the virus apparently causing the disease. In
particular it appeared that underlying this highly focused
outbreak there remained a more or less constant
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Guangdong for a long time and witnessed a slow decline
in Hong Kong, on which superimposes sudden local out-
breaks. This pattern is difficult to reconcile with a standard
epidemic pattern for reasons that have to be analyzed.
Many hypotheses can be put forward to account for this
observation. Learning from a set of coronavirus mediated
epidemics that affected pigs in the 1983 –1985 [1] we
chose to explore here the consequences of a situation
where two overlapping epidemics interfere with each
other. The hypothesis of the double epidemic model for
SARS we develop here is as follow. It is based on the high
mutation and recombination rate of coronaviruses [2],
and on the observation that tissue tropism can be changed
by simple mutations [3]. There are two epidemics, one
epidemic is SARS caused by a coronavirus virus, call it
virus A. Another epidemic, which may have appeared
before SARS, is assumed to be extremely contagious
because of the nature of the virus and of its relative innoc-
uousness, could be propagated by contaminated food and
soiled surfaces. It could be caused by some coronavirus,
call it virus B. The most likely is that it would cause gastro-
enteritis (this fits with the observation that many people
had diarrhoea for about one day, during this winter in
Guangdong and in Hong Kong). The most likely origin of
virus A is a more or less complicated mutation or recom-
bination event from virus B [4–6]. We also explore the
possible situation where viruses A and B would be of
totally different origin, but would cause an overlapping
immune response of the host. Both epidemics would
spread in parallel, and it can be expected that the epi-
demic caused by virus B which is rather innocuous, pro-
tects against SARS (so that naïve regions, not protected by
the epidemic B can get SARS large outbreaks). Various
consequences of the spreading pattern of this double epi-
demic hypothesis are discussed in relation with the puz-
zling distribution of the disease in Mainland China,
noticeably, in the huge difference witnessed between the
situation in Beijing and in Shanghai (both regions have
tight and frequent contacts with Guangdong and Hong
Kong). As a side prediction of the model we can infer con-
clusions on the accuracy of available epidemiological
data.
Results
In this paper, we introduce a new epidemic model to
study the outbreak of SARS in China. We begin with a
brief review on a classical epidemic model, the so called
Susceptible-Infected-Removed (SIR) model which is sim-
ple and useful when one tries to understand the propaga-
tion of many real-life epidemics. We then point out the
shortcomings of the SIR model and explain our motiva-
tions of building a new epidemic model. While this new
model is still relatively simple, it has some nice properties
which makes it possible to model better the outbreak of
SARS in Hong Kong and other cities.
Review on the standard SIR model
Consider a disease that, after recovery, confers immunity
(which includes deaths: dead individuals are still
counted). We assume that there is no entry into or depar-
ture from the population. The population can then be
divided into three distinct classes; the susceptibles, S, who
can catch the disease; the infectives, I, who have the dis-
ease and can transmit it; and the removed class, R, namely
those who have either had the disease, or are recovered,
immune or isolated until recovered. Here we follow the
definition of the class R given in [8]. However, we would
like to draw the readers' attention that this definition of
the class R is different from those given in [7], [11] which
do not include isolated infectives in the class R. The
progress of individuals is schematically described by S →
I → R. Let S(t), I(t) and R(t) be the number of individuals
in each of the corresponding class at time t. Note that usu-
ally only R(t) can be known. It is often considered that
R(t) is the cumulative number of patients admitted to
hospitals. With some reasonable assumptions (which will
be explained in details in the next section), we can show
that these three functions are governed by the following
system of nonlinear ordinary differential equations (see
next section for the derivation of these differential
equations):
where r is the infection rate and a the removal rate of
infectives. The parameters r and a characterize the propa-
gation of the disease and can also be used as control
parameters in order to stop the epidemic. In general, the
functions S, I and R behave as the three curves in Figure 1.
The characteristics of these curves are as follow.
- S decreases monotonically from its initial value to its
final value, while R increases monotonically until it
reaches the limiting value R∞. Both curves have two dis-
tinct periods where the decrease (or increase) is exponen-
tially slow or exponentially fast.
- The function I first increases exponentially and reaches
the maximum value at time t0 and then decreases to zero.
The time t0 is the critical point of the function I at which
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from the observations, it follows that the values of I can
be estimated from the relation  (up to the
unknown multiplicative parameter a). Knowing whether
the I has reached its maximum value can be used by the
health authorities as a criterion to determine if the epi-
demic has entered the decay (extinction) phase.
There are two important figures one would like to know
from the SIR model. First, the limiting value R∞, called the
total size of the epidemic which is the total number of
people having the disease at the end of the epidemic. Sec-
ond, R0 = r/a, the basic reproduction number which is the
average number of secondary infections produced when
one infected individual is introduced into a host popula-
tion where everyone is susceptible. For many determinis-
tic epidemic models, an infection can get started in a fully
susceptible population if and only if R0>1. For the other
aspects of the SIR model, the reader may consult refs [7,8]
and [9].
Even though the SIR model provides a general framework
to understand the spread of a disease, it may be too simple
to accurately model a real epidemic like the outbreak of
SARS in Hong Kong. The spread of SARS in Hong Kong
started on February 21, 2003, when a doctor from Guang-
dong province traveled to Hong Kong to visit his family
and stayed in a local hotel. He had become unwell a few
days earlier and was now seriously ill. He was admitted to
a hospital on February 22 and died shortly after. By the
time he died, he had infected 10 guests who had been
staying at the same hotel. These individuals were subse-
quently responsible for major outbreaks in hospitals in
Hong Kong and the Amoy Gardens, a housing estate in
Hong Kong.
Figure 2 shows the daily new number of confirmed SARS
cases in Hong Kong from 17 March, 2003 to 10 May, 2003
(source: Hong Kong SAR Government press release, http:/
/www.info.gov.hk/dh/ap.htm). The daily number of SARS
cases are grouped into three categories: i) the Amoy Gar-
dens, ii) the community, iii) the hospital staff. The graph
can be considered as an approximation of . The graph
has several peaks and it therefore looks very different from
the general shape of the graph of the function I. In the SIR
model once the I curve decreases, it will decrease to the
zero value Therefore, the standard SIR model could not be
used to model the outbreak of SARS in Hong Kong. If we
take away those cases from the hospital staff and the
Amoy Gardens Estate, that is if we only consider the cases
from the community, then the graph looks closer to the
general shape of a graph for a function I. However, it is
still difficult for a general SIR model to produce a I curve
whose values are within a narrow range (say 15 to 25
cases) for a relatively long time interval. This motivated us
to replace the SIR model by the SEIR model. In this model
there is a fixed period between exposure and becoming
infectious, called latent period (this is in fact the case for
SARS and it is another reason why we consider the SEIR
model). Thus, rather than an exposed susceptible
Typical dynamics for the SIR modelFigure 1
Typical dynamics for the SIR model.
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class, labeled E, remaining there a fixed period of time.
More detailed description of this model will be given in
the next section. It is worth mentioning here that the SEIR
model can produce much more interesting and compli-
cated I, R and  curves. It is also possible to produce a
I curve whose values are within a narrow range for a rela-
tively long time interval and result thus in a relatively large
R∞. Note that the SIR model is the limiting case of the SEIR
model when the time interval from the infection to onset
is zero; for given parameters r and a the total size of the
epidemic is the same in the two models; however the
duration is longer for the SEIR model which will display
lower admission per day curves (or the I curves); if we see
this result from the reciprocal point of view, the same level
of admissions per day will result in a higher total epi-
demic size for the SEIR model than for the SIR model
because of the Exposed class which is "hidden" in the
sense that it has no effects on the other classes until the
individuals move to the Infective class and thus contribut-
ing to the propagation of the epidemic. A numerical illus-
tration of this phenomena is given in Figure 3 that plots
the evolution of the S,E, I and R classes for the two models
with the same parameters r and a.
The parameters estimations are very crucial when one
applies the SIR models. When the initial population of the
susceptibles is very large, a small change in the parameters
can result in a large difference in the values of R∞. For
example, if we take the total initial population, S(0) = 6.8
millions (e.g. the case of Hong Kong) and an initial
infected class of I(0) = 10 persons, together with a = 2/3
and r = 9.788 × 10-8, then R∞ is about 5,000. Suppose we
Daily new number of confirmed SARS cases from Hong Kong: hospital, community and the Amoy GardensFigure 2
Daily new number of confirmed SARS cases from Hong Kong: hospital, community and the Amoy Gardens.
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8, then R∞ will become 116464. This sensitivity in the
parameters can therefore give rise to unacceptable errors
in predicting the size of the epidemic and invalidates thus
the model. Contrariwise, when we try to fit the data with
respect to a hypothetical much smaller population, the
sensitivity decreases. Therefore, we are lead to consider a
model for which the effective population, i.e. the total
population that enters the susceptible class is, for some yet
to define reason, much less than the total population. In
other words, a large portion of the total population is pro-
tected during the epidemic. Note that this happens when
a population undergoes vaccination against a disease, i.e.
some people become not only immune to the epidemic
but do not transmit it neither. It is also possible that the
vaccination against another disease can protect people
from being infected by SARS. Another possibility is that a
different, but similar, disease that spread before (or is
spreading simultaneously with SARS) has immunized
some of the population against SARS; this is our working
hypothesis because it fits better with the relatively surpris-
ing SARS propagation which is less severe in places with
low hygiene conditions. Based on this hypothesis, we
shall develop a double epidemic model, the SEIRP model
to study the outbreak of SARS in the next section.
As will be discussed at the end of this paper an outbreak
of infections caused by a coronavirus and its mutants
[1,10] provided hints that epidemics that superimpose on
each other might account for the situation we are witness-
ing at several places in the world.
A Double Epidemic SEIRP Model
Motivated by the above considerations we shall introduce
a new epidemic model here to describe a double epidemic
interaction. This new model will be called SEIRP model (E
stands for the Exposed class while P stands for protection)
which can be considered as a variant of the standard SIR.
Other variants of the SIR model can be found in 17. We
shall show here that by choosing the parameters carefully,
the solution of the system of non-linear differential equa-
tions governing the SEIRP model can decay extremely
slowly and therefore remains almost constant for a long
time interval. This may explain the fact that a more or less
constant background infection level can be maintained
(eg in Hong Kong or in Guangdong), on which superim-
poses large local outbreaks.
We assume that two groups of infected individuals are
introduced into a large population. One group is infected
by virus A and the other group by virus B. One would like
to describe the spread of the infection within the popula-
tion as a function of time. This will depend on a variety of
circumstances, including the actual disease involved, but
as a first attempt to model directly transmitted diseases we
make some reasonable general assumptions. Assume both
diseases which, after recovery, confers immunity (which
includes deaths: dead individuals are still counted). We
assume that there is no entry into or departure from the
population. The population can then be divided into six
distinct classes. The class of Susceptibles, S, are those who
can catch the disease A or disease B. A susceptible who
catches the disease A first will enter the Exposed class E
which includes those in the latent period, who are
infected by disease A but not yet infectious. After the
latent period ends, the individual enters the class I of
Comparison of the SEIR (red) and SIR (green) models with the same parameters "r" and "a"Figure 3
Comparison of the SEIR (red) and SIR (green) models with the same parameters "r" and "a". SEIR model evolution (in red) is 
much slower (and thus may seam less severe) but reaches the same final size of epidemic.Page 5 of 16
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and can transmit it. When the infectious period ends, the
individual enters the Removed class R, namely those who
are either recovered from disease A, immune or isolated
until recovered from disease. A susceptible who catches
the disease B first will enter the class IP of infectives and
then the Removed class RP. It is assumed that catching dis-
ease B first will protect the individual from catching dis-
ease A. The progress of individuals is schematically
described by the following diagram.
With, S(t), E(t), I(t), R(t) IP(t) and RP(t) as the number of
individuals in each class at time t, we assume here that:
(i) There is no entry into or departure from the popula-
tion, except possibly through death from the disease.
(ii) The gain in the exposed class E is at a rate proportional
to the number of people in the infective class I and that of
the susceptibles S, that is rS(t)I(t), where r > 0 is a
constant.
(iii) The gain in the infective class IP is at a rate propor-
tional to the number of people in the infective class IP and
that of the susceptibles S, that is rPS(t)IP(t), where rP > 0 is
a constant.
(iv) The susceptibles are therefore lost at the rate rS(t)I(t)
+ rPS(t)IP(t).
(v) The rate of removal of the people in class E to the
infective class I is proportional to the number of people in
class E, that is bE(t), where b is a positive number. It can
be shown that the fraction of people remaining in the
exposed class E s time unit after entering class E is e-bs, so
the length of the latent period is distributed exponentially
with mean equals to e-bs ds = 1/b (c.f. [11]).
(vi) The rate of removal of infectives in class I to the
removed class R is proportional to the number of
infectives in class I, that is aI(t), where a is a positive
number. It can be shown that the fraction of people
remaining in the infective class I s time unit after entering
class I is e-as, so the length of the infectious period is dis-
tributed exponentially with mean equals to e-as ds = 1/a.
(vii) The rate of removal of people in infective class IP to
the removal class RP is proportional to the number of peo-
ple in class IP, that is aPIP(t), where aPis a positive number.
(viii) The incubation period (the time from first infection
to the appearances of symptoms) plus the onset to admis-
sion interval is equal to the sum of the latent period and
the infectious period and is therefore equal to 1/b + 1/a.
We now assume the various classes as uniformly mixed:
that is each pair of individuals has equal probability of
coming into contact with one another. The model mech-
anism is then governed by the following system of non-
linear ordinary differential equations:
The above system of differential equations are derived
from the so-called simple mass action incidence approach
which is described in [11]. The interpretation of the con-
stant r is as follows. An average infective of disease A
makes contact sufficient to transmit infection with rN oth-
ers per unit time, where N is the total population. Note
that the probability that a random contact by an infective
with a susceptible, who can then transmit infection, is S/
N, therefore the number of new infections in unit time is
(rN)(S/N)I = rSI. One can also interpret rP in a similar way.
Here r and rP are related to the infection rate of disease A
and B respectively, while a, aP and b are the removal rate
of individuals in class I, IP and E respectively. The last two
equations follow from the assumption that the popula-
tion size N is constant. We are, of course, only interested
in non-negative solutions for S, E, I,R, IP and RP.
In the SEIRP model, there is no latency for the disease B.
The inclusion of the latency for the disease B will imply
the introduction of one additional parameter bP and will
further complicate the model. Since the main purpose of
the paper is to provide some indirect evidence that a dou-
ble epidemic may exist, our simpler model may already be
good enough for this purpose because of the following
reasons. Firstly, even if the diseases A and B are generated
from similar viruses, they can still be quite different (for
instance at the level of the physical location of the infec-
tion) and therefore they need not share similar models.
Secondly, since we only want to study phenomena that
immunize people from the initial S class, the details of the
S
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less important that those of the propagation of the
epidemic A. Of course, future studies may try to analyze at
a finer level the spread of the protective epidemic once its
existence and characteristics have been assessed in
practice.
Note that two types of protections "static" and "dynamic"
can be seen as particular cases of a double epidemic
model:
- the "static" protection is given by a protective epidemic
(that has already finished its spreading) or a vaccine leav-
ing some of the population immune; this amounts to only
consider a fraction of the initial population in the Suscep-
tibles class S (and to set IP(0) = 0 because the spread has
already taken place); equivalently this can be imple-
mented by putting at the initial time some of the popula-
tion in the Removed class R (i.e., R(0) > 0).
- the "dynamic" protection is when the protective epi-
demic spreads at the same time with the SARS giving rise
to various interference patterns.
One may wonder if the "dynamic" protection assumption
is really necessary to get a good fit of the data. We have
tested the "static" protection assumption by setting the
total population to several initial values less than the real
population (see also the case a) of Hong-Kong simula-
tions below) but the fit quality was generally less satisfac-
tory than in the case of the co-existing epidemics (i.e.
"dynamic" effect) ; more testing is needed to fully certify
this conclusion.
Case study : the Outbreak of SARS in Hong Kong
We shall apply the SEIRP model to study the outbreak of
SARS in Hong Kong. In particular, we would like to
explain the fact that a more or less constant background
infection level remained present in Hong Kong for a long
period of time, on which superimposes large local out-
breaks at the several hospitals and the Amoy Gardens, a
housing estate in Hong Kong. If we only consider those
SARS cases from the community, i.e. we take away the
number of confirmed SARS cases from the Amoy Gardens
and those from the local hospitals, then most of the daily
new number of confirmed cases from the community
stayed around 15 to 25 (of course this level went down
after strong confinement directives were implemented by
the Hong Kong government).
To apply our model to study the outbreak of SARS in
Hong Kong, we assume that disease A is caused by SARS
virus, while disease B is caused by some unknown virus
and disease B "protects" people from being infected by
SARS provided that they are infected by disease B first. We
accept that A can be derived from B, after a mutation and/
or recombination event. Since we do not know how many
Hong Kong people are infected by virus B, we shall con-
sider the following two scenarios: a) 0.5 million Hong
Kong people are infected by disease B. b) only 10 Hong
Kong people are infected by disease B.
Case a
First, we assume that IP(0) = 0.5 million, that is 0.5 mil-
lion Hong Kong people are infected by disease B. This
assumption is quite reasonable because we believe that
disease B is caused by a gastro-enteritis virus which is usu-
ally highly contagious. Since the population of Hong
Kong is about 6.8 million, we therefore assume that S(0)
= 6.8 – 0.5 = 6.3 million. We then assume rather arbitrar-
ily that E(0) = 100 and I(0) = 50. With these initial condi-
tions, we tried to search the parameter values by a
gradient-based optimization algorithm. The result is if we
use the parameter values r = 10.19 × 10-8, rP = 7.079 × 10-
8, a = 0.47, aP = 0.461 and b = 0.103, then the resulting
curve for R fits very well with the observed total number
of confirmed cases of SARS from the community. We fit
the model with the total number of confirmed cases from
17 March, 2003 to 10 May, 2003 (totally 55 days). Figure
4 is the curve for R, while figure 5 shows the expected and
observed daily new cases. The limiting value of the curve
R is 1011.
Recall that the incubation period plus the time from onset
to admission can be estimated by 1/a + 1/b. If we take a =
0.47 and b = 0.103, then 1/a + 1/b = 11.83. On the other
hand, from the statistics obtained in, the observed mean
of the incubation period for SARS is 6.37. The observed
mean of the time from onset to admission is about 3.75.
Therefore, the observed sum 10.12 = 6.37+3.75 which is
close to the estimation 11.83.
Case b
We consider here the extreme case that IP(0) = 10, that is
only 10 Hong Kong people are infected by disease B. S(0)
is assumed to be 6.8 million and we still assume that E(0)
= 100 and I(0) = 50. The parameters obtained by the gra-
dient-based optimization algorithm are as follows: r =
10.08 × 10-8, rP = 7.94 × 10-8, a = 0.52, aP = 0.12 and b =
0.105. The resulting curve for R fits well with the observed
total number of confirmed cases of SARS from the com-
munity from 17 March, 2003 to 10 May, 2003 (totally 55
days). Figure 6 is the curve for R, while Figure 7 shows the
expected and observed daily new cases. The limiting value
of the curve R is 1033. Note that a = 0.52 and b = 0.105
and therefore 1/a + 1/b = 11.44 which is close to the
observed figure 10.12. Both the parameters rP and a are
greater than the corresponding parameters in case a. This
is reasonable as the initial population IP(0) = 10 is muchPage 7 of 16
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to spread much faster in order to "protect" people from
being infected by SARS.
Case study : the Outbreak of SARS in Beijing
We have also applied the SEIRP model to study the out-
break of SARS in Beijing. The statistics on the numbers of
SARS cases in Beijing are obtained from http://
www.moh.gov.cn/zhgl/yqfb/index.htm. The initial
population S(0) was set to be 13.82 millions; the other
parameters (including the initial conditions) that charac-
terise the model were optimised to obtain the best fit; we
obtained thus E(0) = 400; IP(0) = 35000; I(0) = 340; R(0)
= 0; RP(0) = 0; r = 7.69 × 10-8; rP = 10.79 × 10-8; a = 0.488;
aP = 0.618; b = 0.103. Figure 8 and 9 show that the model
fit well with the observation in both the numbers cumu-
lative cases and the daily new cases. The total number of
people infected with the protective virus is RP = 12 mil-
lions. If the values of the parameters defining the model
remain the same this simulation results in a final value of
the total people infected with the SARS virus (that is R∞)
at the level of 2700.
Case study : the Outbreak of SARS in Inner Mongolia
Here we consider the outbreak of SARS in Inner Mongolia.
The statistics on the numbers of SARS cases in Inner Mon-
golia are obtained from http://www.moh.gov.cn/zhgl/
yqfb/index.htm. The initial population S(0) was The total
population was taken to be S(0) = 23.67 millions ; the
other parameters (including the initial conditions) were
optimised to ensure a good agreement with the data and
were obtained to be E(0) = 2; IP(0) = 137638; I(0) = 32;
R(0) = 0; RP(0) = 0; r = 1.62 × 10-8; rP = 3.87 × 10-8; a =
0.120, aP = 0.272; b = 7.644. The graphical representation
of the simulation is given in figure 10 and figure 11. If the
parameters above are used to simulate the future spread of
epidemic we obtain the value of R∞ to be 350.
Comment on the estimations of the parameters
Note that there are two possible ways of estimating the
parameters in the model. The first one is to first fix the
The cumulative number of SARS cases in Hong Kong community (and the simulated case "a")Figure 4
The cumulative number of SARS cases in Hong Kong community (and the simulated case "a").
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BMC Infectious Diseases 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/3/19values of a and b for all the different scenarios before the
parameters r, rP and aP are chosen to fit the data. The sec-
ond approach is simply choosing all the parameters to fit
the data. We chose the second approach because we do
believe that there are also some good reasons for the vari-
ations of the parameters a and b in different cases.
The parameters a and aP describe the removal from the
classes I and IP to the classes R and RP respectively. Since
the removed classes R are considered to contain the indi-
viduals with infections the parameters a and aP character-
ize the identification rate of potential cases; it is then
rather related to the health policy than to the disease itself
(e.g. a is not the mortality rate!). Since health policies vary
from places to places and the parameters a and aP are not
directly related to the disease itself these parameters are
not to be considered known but will rather be computed
by fitting the simulation results to the data.
The parameter b describes the evolution from the exposed
class E to the infectives class I; its reciprocal 1/b is related
to the latent period of the disease; as such it is indeed
more characteristic of the disease itself than the parameter
a but it may still be affected by the geographic region. For
instance, the lifestyles of the people in Beijing and Inner
Mongolia are very different because Beijing is the capital,
and hence much richer (with better hygiene, but with
more important air pollution). The value of the b param-
eter will also be obtained from the fitting procedure.
Finally, our approach that not fixing the parameters a and
b at the very beginning but rather than estimating them
from the data can let us to indirectly verify the double
epidemic hypothesis. In fact, as already pointed out in the
paper, 1/a+1/b can be considered as the incubation period
plus the onset to admission interval. For the two Hong
Kong scenarios we considered, our estimations are quite
close to the observed figures.
Note that in Hong Kong, r >rP but this relation is reversed
in Beijing and Inner Mongolia. One possible reason for
these differences is that the values of r and rP depend on
Number of SARS cases in Hong Kong community (and the simulated case "a") per three daysFigur  5
Number of SARS cases in Hong Kong community (and the simulated case "a") per three days.
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BMC Infectious Diseases 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/3/19how the daily contact patterns of people. The usual
number of social contacts of a person is in general higher
in big cities like Beijing and Hong Kong while lower in
remote area like Inner Mongolia. This may explain the dif-
ference of the r and rP values in these cases.
While parameters r and rP are related to the infective rates
that may depend on the hygienic situation, the a's and b
are closer to clinical properties of the infection. That they
differ quite a lot in different scenarios is surprising. In par-
ticular, the b value for Inner Mongolia is 76 times that of
Beijing, implying that latency lasts so much longer in Bei-
jing. One explanation is there may be a difference in the
spread of the "protective" epidemic, that might have
started earlier at one of those places. Another explanation
is due to the latent immunodepression of the people
there. This means that people do not build up a strong
immune response when infected, because they are either
infected by other viruses (this is the case of AIDS) or
because they are generally in poor health. Note that they
were recently more or less submitted to a severe draught,
which meant that they were probably undernourished.
Discussion
The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome outbreak is the
first epidemic of the XXIst century. We do not know
whether it will start again next autumn, and we need to
combine a variety of approaches to tackle the epidemic,
making it as short as possible, and preparing for future
similar, or less similar outbreaks. In this context, mathe-
matical models can have several functions. They may be
phenomenological and descriptive, to predict the imme-
diate future [7]. They may also propose hypotheses and
explore their consequences in order to provide political
and medical authorities with orientations that may help
them to take decisions, at a time when a situation is rap-
idly evolving. The model we explore here is meant to that
purpose. We started to try to account for the data collected
on the disease using the standard epidemiological model,
the Susceptible-Infected-Removed (SIR) epidemic model
[12,13,17]. As shown in the first section of our work, data
do not fit with the model. In particular, the long "tail" of
the number of cases that appears to be trailing for a long
time cannot be easily accounted for in this framework. In
addition there are huge discrepancies, within the same
The cumulative number of SARS cases in Hong Kong community (and the simulated case "b")Figure 6
The cumulative number of SARS cases in Hong Kong community (and the simulated case "b").
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BMC Infectious Diseases 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/3/19country, and with people who are highly connected both
in terms of travelling and communication, and in genetic
background, between the number of cases, as illustrated
by the difference between the number of SARS cases in
Beijing (in thousands) and in Shanghai (in tens at most).
Of course one obvious explanation might be a difference
in reporting cases (see below), but this looks unlikely in
these two cities which are so tightly connected to the rest
of the world that it would be difficult to hide such a severe
disease.
In a situation where the accuracy of data is disputable, it
would be counterproductive (and even unscientific) to try
to incorporate the many fine details of causes of an epi-
demic. It is important to extract an outline of what is hap-
pening with models that are progressively made more
complex, in order to extract the relevant parameters and
try to draw conclusions on the many possible causes and
controls of epidemics. When finding that the SIR model
could not account for the available data we faced many
possibilities based on virus behavior, population
dynamics, technical difficulties in identifying the disease
(many atypical to the respiratory tract. We explored two
major situations. One when the epidemics pneumonia
types exist) and socio-political constraints that cast signif-
icant doubt on the accuracy of data collection. Knowing
the nature of the virus that causes SARS [14], a coronavi-
rus, we chose here to start by exploring the consequences
of a situation that prevailed twenty years ago in the popu-
lation of pigs in Europe [10,15], where a virus and its var-
iant caused a double epidemic when it changed its
tropism from the small intestine are subsequent to each
other, in a way allowing the first one to provide some pro-
tection to part of the exposed population. This situation is
not fundamentally different from the situation explored
by the SIR model. It may account for places with a large
population and a low level of prevalence. In contrast, a
second situation where both epidemics overlap, the first
one being highly contagious and under no control
because it is understood as a mild frequent ailment and
the second one causing SARS, will give rise to patterns that
appear to be similar to what is observed in places such as
Number of SARS cases in Hong-Kong community (and the simulated case "b") per three daysFigur  7
Number of SARS cases in Hong-Kong community (and the simulated case "b") per three days.
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BMC Infectious Diseases 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/3/19Cumulative number of SARS cases in BeijingFigure 8
Cumulative number of SARS cases in Beijing.
Number of SARS cases per day in BeijingFigur  9
Number of SARS cases per day in Beijing.
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BMC Infectious Diseases 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/3/19Hong Kong and the Guangdong province. It is worth
stressing that we did not explore the intricacies of the
mathematical solutions of this new epidemiological
model, but, rather, tried to test with very crude hypotheses
whether a new mode of transmission might not account
for surprising aspects of some epidemics. The central rea-
son for our approach is that the more parameters intro-
duced, the easier it is to represent any type of reality (this
was the basis of the epicycle representation of the move-
ment of planets in the Ptolemean system). Because data
may be inaccurate (and at the time of writing this is a
major concern for the WHO authorities) it is convenient
to smooth them out. This is convenient in a continuous
model represented by a set of simple differential equa-
tions. A drawback of this approach appears when the
number of cases becomes small: a discrete model involv-
ing stochastic parameters would be more adapted. How-
ever this would probably require even more accuracy in
the data, a feat that is impossible to achieve. A second con-
straint introduced by inaccuracy in the data set is that the
behavior of the epidemic is so complex that it would
require many parameters to be represented, implying, in
fact that a very large set of causes would account for the
observations. We tried to overcome these difficulties by
restricting as much as possible the number of fitting
parameters in the model. Furthermore we checked that
the parameters we introduced were consistent with a
purely phenomenological description of the disease. In
fact, from the work of Donnelly C. et al. [18] on the statis-
tics about the outbreak of SARS in Hong Kong, the incu-
bation period plus the time from onset to admission is
about 10.12 days. On the other hand, the incubation
period plus the time from onset to admission is about 1/
a + 1/b days and from our parameters estimations on a
and b, we find that 1/a + 1/b is about 11.8 and 11.4 for two
different scenarios. With these constraints we were able to
simulate the epidemic at several places (Hong Kong, Bei-
jing, Inner Mongolia) while other places failed to be rep-
resented faithfully (for instance for the Guangdong region
where the size of the epidemic – with only 2 or 3 new
cases for some days – is too small when compared with
the total population of over 80 millions : in this case
either the data does not reflect the real situation or the dif-
ferential model is not relevant for this setting). Further-
more we could use the set of parameters measured from
the past unfolding of the epidemic, to construct scenarios
for its future trends and monitor the impact of political
decisions to control its spread and development.
Note that the above results are to be treated with care
when trying to validate provisional hypothesis. Indeed,
we noticed that due to the imprecision inherent in the
Cumulative number of SARS cases in Inner MongoliaFigure 10
Cumulative number of SARS cases in Inner Mongolia.
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BMC Infectious Diseases 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/3/19data many sets of parameters display good fit with the
observed time series; however the difference of behaviour
between e.g. the final size of the epidemic as given by this
simulations is sometimes important (error bars too large)
and cannot be reliably asserted in the absence of further
investigations. However some qualitative properties of
the dynamics of the system under consideration can prove
to be important when analysing this epidemic. For
instance one important problem is the question of
whether the epidemic is under control or not. Contrary to
the standard SIR model where this question has a simple
answer, here we cannot say that the epidemic is under
control when the number of admission per day decreases;
indeed in the SEIR models, it may happen that momentar-
ily the number of people in the Infective class is low while
the Exposed class is still high (they have not yet been
infectious); thus the epidemic may seem stopped but will
then be out of control again when in people in the
Exposed class migrate to the Infected class and will start
contaminating other people (especially if sanitary security
policy has been relaxed). Thus an effective policy necessar-
ily takes into account the time required for the Exposed
(E) class to become infectious and will require zero new
cases during all the period. The double epidemic can have
a flat, extended peak and short tail compared to a single
epidemic, and it may have more than one peak because of
the latency so that claims of success may be premature.
An interesting outcome of the present model is that it can
point out places where either the model does not hold
(indicating that there are other causes interfering with the
disease) or that data collection is not accurate (providing
a way to political authorities to enforce a new policy for
identifying patients and collecting data). A second, per-
haps more comforting consequence is that it suggests that
a vaccine will be possible: indeed, in our model one form
of the virus (or, alternatively, other viruses displaying
cross immunity) is protecting against SARS. This is typi-
cally what is expected from a vaccine and this is perhaps
what is witnessed with the apparent low infection rate or,
at least mild infection, in children and young adults (an
observation that needs to be fully documented). We
should however remain cautious, since vaccination
against coronaviruses is not always straightforward [16]. If
our model is right, then it is likely that virus B gave several
different types of A variants, causing SARS with a variety
of virulence. This may also account for some of the varia-
bility observed at different places. This might be substan-
tiated by sequencing CoV genomes isolated from many
patients. If this were true, then the reservoir might be
Number of SARS cases per day in Inner MongoliaFigur  11
Number of SARS cases per day in Inner Mongolia.
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BMC Infectious Diseases 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/3/19much larger than suspected and SARS may happen again
when the weather cools down in autumn. Our model
would then be useful to enforce proper precautionary
measures immediately.
Finally, there are many other possible scenarios, and as
stated in the conclusion of the WHO panel held on 15–17
May 2003 in Geneva: "Participants from the main
outbreak sites noted the striking similarity of the pattern
of outbreaks in different countries and the consistent
effectiveness of specific control measures, including early
identification and isolation of patients, vigorous contact
tracing, management of close contacts by home confine-
ment or quarantine, and public information and educa-
tion to encourage prompt reporting of symptoms. The
effectiveness of these measures was observed in all out-
break sites under widely varying conditions, supporting
the overall WHO view that SARS can be contained and
driven back out of its new human host." The present work
aims at helping exploring one possible route accounting
for at least some of the features of the epidemic.
Conclusions
The first conclusion of the present work is that except at
very restricted places recording a simple event, such as the
Amoy Gardens Estate outbreak, the SIR model cannot rep-
resent the unfolding of the SARS epidemic, even at its first
steps. This indicates that the simple model of contagion
by a single stable virus does not hold. The second conclu-
sion is that, at least in some regions, data may be inaccu-
rate to account for the reality of the epidemic. This is true
in various parts of mainland China and can be accounted
for by the large variation in SARS symptoms, and perhaps
in provinces next to Beijing, by underreporting. Finally,
this study sends a message of hope: lack of fitting of pre-
dicted curves with actual recent data indicate that the
containment measures decided by the WHO and relayed
by governments are effective. Furthermore, this model,
that assumes that a mild epidemic protects against SARS
would predict that a vaccine is possible, and may soon be
created. It also suggests that there might exist a SARS pre-
cursor in a large reservoir, prompting for implementation
of precautionary measures when the weather cools down.
Competing interests
None declared.
Authors' contributions
TW Ng derived the system of non-linear differential equa-
tions governing the SEIRP model, collected the figures of
SARS cases in different cities, carried out some numerical
simulations and the parameters estimations.
GT contributed to the derivation of the differential equa-
tions that describe the model, carried out numerical sim-
ulations and the parameter fitting procedures.
AD provided the biological background for setting up the
model and proposed, based on the 1983–1985 outbreak
of coronavirus infection in European pigs the "double epi-
demic" hypothesis.
Acknowledgements
The authors acknowledge helpful discussions with Prof. B. Perthame from 
Paris VI University, Dr. W.K. Ching and Prof. N. Mok from the University 
of Hong Kong.
References
1. Rasschaert D, Duarte M and Laude H: Porcine respiratory coro-
navirus differs from transmissible gastroenteritis virus by a
few genomic deletions. J Gen Virol 1990, 71 ( Pt 11):2599-2607.
2. Compton SR, Barthold SW and Smith AL: The cellular and molec-
ular pathogenesis of coronaviruses. Lab Anim Sci 1993, 43:15-28.
3. Haijema BJ, Volders H and Rottier PJ: Switching species tropism:
an effective way to manipulate the feline coronavirus
genome. J Virol 2003, 77:4528-4538.
4. Enjuanes L, Sanchez C, Gebauer F, Mendez A, Dopazo J and Balles-
teros ML: Evolution and tropism of transmissible gastroen-
teritis coronavirus. Adv Exp Med Biol 1993, 342:35-42.
5. Ballesteros ML, Sanchez CM, Martin-Caballero J and Enjuanes L:
Molecular bases of tropism in the PUR46 cluster of transmis-
sible gastroenteritis coronaviruses. Adv Exp Med Biol 1995,
380:557-562.
6. Ballesteros ML, Sanchez CM and Enjuanes L: Two amino acid
changes at the N-terminus of transmissible gastroenteritis
coronavirus spike protein result in the loss of enteric
tropism. Virology 1997, 227:378-388.
7. Anderson R and May R: Infectious diseases in humans. Oxford,
Oxford University Press; 1991. 
8. Murray JD: Mathematical Biology. 2ndth edition. Berlin, Springer
Verlag; 1993. 
9. Bailey NJT: The Mathematical theory of Infectious Diseases
and its Applications. London, Griffin; 1975. 
10. Garwes DJ: Transmissible gastroenteritis. Vet Rec 1988,
122:462-463.
11. Brauer F and Castillo-Chavez C: Mathematical Models in Popu-
lation Biology and Epidemiology. Berlin, Springer Verlag; 2001. 
12. Anderson H and Britton T: Stochastic Epidemic models and
Their Statiatical Analysis. Lecture Notes in Statistics Volume 151.
New York, Springer; 2000. 
13. Diekmann O and Heesterbeek J: Mathematical  Epidemiology of
Infectious disease. Wiley Series in Mathematical and Computational
Biology Chichester, Wiley; 2000. 
14. Fouchier RA, Kuiken T, Schutten M, Van Amerongen G, Van Door-
num GJ, Van Den Hoogen BG, Peiris M, Lim W, Stohr K and Oster-
haus AD: Aetiology: Koch's postulates fulfilled for SARS virus.
Nature 2003, 423:240.
15. Laude  H, Rasschaert D, Delmas  B and Eleouët J-F: Le coronavirus
respiratoire porcin PRCV : un virus émergent pas comme les
autres. Virologie 1998, 2:305-316.
16. Saif LJ, van Cott JL and Brim TA: Immunity to transmissible gas-
troenteritis virus and porcine respiratory coronavirus infec-
tions in swine. Vet Immunol Immunopathol 1994, 43:89-97.
17. Hethcote HW: The Mathematics of Infectious Diseases. SIAM
Review 2000, 42:599-653.
18. Donnelly CA, Ghani AC, Leung GM, Hedley AJ, Fraser C, Riley S,
Abu-Raddad LJ, Ho LM, Thach TQ, Chau P, Chan KP, Lam TH, Tse
LY, Tsang T, Liu SH, Kong JH, Lau EM, Ferguson NM and Anderson
RM: Epidemiological determinants of spread of causal agent
of severe acute respiratory syndrome in Hong Kong. Lancet
2003, 361:1761-1766.Page 15 of 16
(page number not for citation purposes)
BMC Infectious Diseases 2003, 3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/3/19Publish with BioMed Central   and  every 
scientist can read your work free of charge
"BioMed Central will be the most significant development for 
disseminating the results of biomedical research in our lifetime."
Sir Paul Nurse, Cancer Research UK
Your research papers will be:
available free of charge to the entire biomedical community
peer reviewed and published immediately upon acceptance
cited in PubMed and archived on PubMed Central 
yours — you keep the copyright
Submit your manuscript here:
http://www.biomedcentral.com/info/publishing_adv.asp
BioMedcentral
Pre-publication history
The pre-publication history for this paper can be accessed
here:
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/3/19/prepubPage 16 of 16
(page number not for citation purposes)
